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Abstract
Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we
explore the question whether local electoral rules affect the size of local governments. We
find evidence that party–list system is associated with higher levels of expenditure and
that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower size of the public sector. The
results are robust to the possibility that electoral rules might be endogenous to the local
economic and geographic conditions.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between fiscal federalism and the size of the public sector remains
an area in which no clear empirical picture prevails. Recent analyses of fiscal federalism
highlight that office–oriented politicians might abuse their power over the local budgets
according to own objective functions e.g. involve in rent extraction or corruption. Most
theories of competitive federalism support existence of smaller public sectors in decentral-
ized countries, on the basis of the argument that local decision makers are more accountable
to local voters and therefore have few opportunities to misbehave. Moreover, if the taxes
are raised at the local level, the local population will keep a close watch on the efficiency
of provision of public services financed from their own pockets. Therefore, political ac-
countability at the local level should provide a strong incentive to the politicians to reduce
inefficient spending as well as involvement in rent seeking. On the other hand, growing
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literature on local political budget cycles suggests, that local politicians involve in budget
manipulations before elections to increase the prospects of reelection. It has been reported
that total expenditure tends to rise before the elections (see e.g. Veiga and Veiga, 2007;
Castro and Martins, 2014; Furdas et al., 2015; Galli and Rossi, 2002). The increase in
spending is afterwards compensated either by an increase in tax rates or deficit balancing
through drops of expenditure shortly after the election has taken place.
In this work, we want to explore whether electoral rules, which affect the incentives
of incumbent politicians matter for the size of local government spending using a unique
set of electoral rules present in the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg. Arguably, the
three parallel voting systems in place in Vorarlberg represent a unique source of variation
in electoral incentives of the incumbents and levels of electoral accountability. According
to our knowledge, the only other country in Europe for which such institutional differences
in the local election procedures exist is Switzerland.
Previous literature exploiting the differences in local electoral systems focused mostly
on Swiss cantonal and municipal elections. Pommerehne (1978) exploits the fact that
in the 1970s some Swiss municipalities were direct democracies whereas others used a
representative democratic system and finds that the median voter model better reflects the
pattern of expenditures if decisions are made directly. Similarly, Feld and Kirchgassner
(1999) find that direct democracy has an impact on debt levels of municipalities. Yet,
arguably due to lack of a suitable ”natural experiment” setting, the literature on the
effects of electoral rules on fiscal outcomes at the local level is very scarce.
An important factor for determining the incentives of the local governments to manip-
ulate the expenditure levels is the prospect of reelection. Brender (2003) has observed that
reelection prospects substantially affect the fiscal outcomes on the local level. Addition-
ally, possibility of reelection has been found to increase accountability levels and therefore
reduce corruption of the mayors (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).
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Wide literature addresses the opposite question: whether fiscal performance at the
local level affects the reelection probabilities. Following the seminal articles of Nordhaus
(1975) and Rogoff et al. (1990), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral
manipulation of fiscal instruments increases the incumbent’s chances of getting reelected,
while Veiga and Veiga (2007) use data from Portuguese municipalities to find that higher
expenditures over the whole term (and specifically in election years) increase the chances
of political success. This literature suggests, that incumbents have incentive to expand the
budgets of the municipalities in order to affect reelection probabilities.
Finally, as put forward by Drazen and Eslava (2010), voters and incumbents may prefer
different types of government expenditures. Therefore, incumbents may try to influence
voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than the total level of
public spending. In this perspective, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) found no evidence
of a political budget cycle for Canadian provinces with respect to aggregate spending.
However, they found a budgetary cycle for capital expenditures. Arguably, there are
reasons to believe that the incumbents not only manipulate different types expenditure
before the election, but that the rules lead to different expenditure patterns also outside
of the election period.
In the next subsection, we present the institutions present in Vorarlberg and formulate
hypotheses about the impact of these institutions on the levels of public expenditure.
Section 2 presents the dataset, variables used in the regression as well as the methodology
of analysis. Section 3 presents the main results and Section 4 concludes the work.
1.1. Institutions and hypotheses
The state (German: ”Bundesland”) of Vorarlberg is the westernmost federation state
of Austria. It is further divided into 96 municipalities (Gemeinden) of diverse size and
area. Mostly populated is Dornbirn with 47.420 inhabitants whereas the least populated
Du¨nserberg inhabits only 144 members of the community. Municipalities in Austria and in
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particular in Vorarlberg are divided into three administrative categories typically associated
with size: normal municipalities, market municipalities and cities. There are currently 80
normal municipalities, 11 market municipalities and 5 cities in Vorarlberg.
Typically, in most European democracies electoral rules at the local level are centrally
governed. In federal states, electoral rules may differ at the state level as well e.g. this
is the case in Germany and Austria. In Austria the latter is true for most federal states:
state law governs electoral laws for municipal elections. A unique exception to this rule is
observed in the federal state of Vorarlberg. The electoral rules are set at the local level
and since the year 2000 there exist three parallel systems in place: semi–open list for
the municipal council together with a direct election of the mayor, semi–open list system
often connected with preselection of the list members by the electorate and finally an open
election in which each eligible voter freely decides on whom to elect as a the member of the
municipal council. Before the year 2000, all municipalities have used a semi–open party
system without the direct election of the mayor.
In the semi open–list system, the local parties populate the party lists as well as suggest
candidates for the office of the mayor. Eligible electors can place one vote for a list to the
municipal council and one vote for a mayor’s office candidate. Additionally, each voter may
place up to five votes for individual candidates on the chosen list. If in a direct election of
the mayor only one candidate stands for the election, voters can still place a Yes/No poll.
In 2010, 65 out of 96 municipalities conducted the election according to this system.
The second variant is a different version of a semi open–list party system. It is often
preceded by a consultation with the electorate. Parties either send empty polls to the
voter who then place the names of desired candidates on the lists, or send a preselected
candidates’ lists and voters may decide on the order of placement. The mayor is, however,
not directly elected but chosen by the council of the municipality among their freshly
elected members. In 2010, the system was used in 17 municipalities.
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The last system is entirely open. Each voter receives an empty voting sheet at which
she is eligible to place names of desired members of the municipal council freely chosen
from all members of the community with a passive suffrage. She can choose a number
of names up to a double of the arranged seats in the local council. The newly elected
members of the council subsequently choose the mayor among themselves. In 2010, this
rule was used in 14 municipalities.
We believe that the set of presented rules offers a unique opportunity to explore the
research questions. Unlike for the case of cross–country studies and country–level studies,
there are comparatively few factors that would affect the fiscal outcomes and differen-
tiate the local entities. Municipalities in the analyzed region differ on grounds of some
demographic variables, for which we control, but do not differ in terms of budgeting rules
or access to central government transfers, as these are either centrally or regionally (for
the whole Bundesland) predetermined. Some differences in the access to financing stem
from the fiscal equalization scheme, which aims at reducing the discrepancies between
the municipal ’financial strength’ (Finanzkraft), i.e. providing the means necessary for
the municipalities to perform a basic provision of public services and these differences are
controlled for as explained in Section 2.
The above–cited literature offers a set of suggestions as for how electoral rules should
affect the fiscal outcomes. Firstly, different electoral rules systematically and indepen-
dently of individual characteristics of the mayor affect the probabilities of reelection. The
probability of reelection in turn affects the incentives faced by the politicians in making
expenditure decisions. The open system present in certain municipalities in our database
is arguably the one in which the mayor has much lower probability of reelection than in the
party–list system. Virtually any person in the municipality can become a member of the
municipal council which in turns selects the mayor. For this system we expect the expen-
diture levels to be manipulated in the least. In other words, party–list system compared
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to the open system should be associated with higher expenditure levels.
Direct elections of the mayor increase the possibility of reelection. In case the mayor is
chosen indirectly from the members of the council, she needs to stand against all the other
members, number of which will typically be much higher then the number of candidates
standing for a direct election. If this is true, directly elected mayor faces a stronger incentive
to manipulate the expenditure levels. High electoral competition, i.e. higher number of
candidates standing for direct election should in turn be associated with lower levels of
expenditure. Margin of victory, on the other hand, reflects the a priori strength of the
incumbent politician: the higher the margin of victory, the less incentive there is for the
mayor to affect the expenditure. On the hand, however, directly elected mayor does not
necessarily have a support of the local council in his executive decisions, as opposed to the
indirect system, in which, almost by definition, the mayor faces support of the municipal
council. In such a case, expenditure might not be easily manipulable by a directly elected
mayor, and the effect will be the opposite.
2. Data and methodology
Data comprises information about 96 municipalities in Vorarlberg between years 2000
and 2013, a total of 1053 observations. Fiscal and demographic data has been obtained
from the Austrian Statistical Office database, whereas electoral data has been collected
from the electoral database of Land Vorarlberg (Vorarlberg, 2015).
Dependent variables are natural logarithms of current and capital expenditure levels
per capita (variables Current and Capital). Main economic determinants of expenditure
levels include, obviously the level of revenue (Revenue – natural logarithm per capita), as
well as access to local taxation. We include two variables describing local taxation pat-
terns: Municipal Taxes and Communal Taxes. This distinction is relevant in the Austrian
context. Municipal taxes including taxes on local economic activities such as tourist taxes,
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administrative fees, trade taxes and property taxes reflect the economic development of
the region. On the other hand, communal taxes, are an important proxy for the ’financial
strength’ of the community and in turn its access to the funding from the fiscal equaliza-
tion scheme1. This variable serves as a proxy to the access of a municipality to means
transferred via the fiscal equalization scheme.
The most important political variables represent the different sets of electoral rules.
Dummy variable Direct Mayor takes value 1 for the municipalities, in which the mayor is
elected directly and there is one candidate standing for the election. Furthermore, dummy
variables 2 – 5 Candidates inform how many candidates were participating in the election,
in case there was more than one. Similarly, dummy variable List System takes value 1 if
the party–list system is presented as opposed to the open system. The number of electoral
lists between 1 and 5 is taken into account.
We control for the electoral budget cycle. Municipal elections in the region take place
every five years, and in our sample the relevant years are 2000, 2005 and 2010. Additionally
we control for the margin of victory of the candidates in a direct election and lists in the
party–list systems as well as turnout at the elections.
Public expenditure at the local level is typically also determined by demographic and
geographic variables. These variables typically include size of the population (Werck et al.,
2008; Costa-Font and Moscone, 2009) population density (Sanz et al., 2002), fraction of
the elderly and young inhabitants (Hayo and Neumeier, 2012; Veiga and Veiga, 2007),
unemployment rates (Foucault et al., 2008) and some country specific controls. Since we
dispose of information on the actual number of retired persons, we use this variable instead
of population over 65 in the regressions. In fact, in Austria high share of population, for
various reasons, becomes retired before the usual legal age, and the actual number of
1According to the Austrian fiscal equalization law, financial need of the municipality is calculated on
the basis of potential income from millage tax and actual income from communal tax.
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retired inhabitants is, in this case, a much better measure of demand for social services
than the age structure. Additional dummy variables Markt and Stadt reflect whether the
municipality has a ’market municipality’ or ’city’ status.
One of the concerns when explaining diverse categories of expenditures is that un-
observed heterogeneity might influence both types of expenditure, i.e. the errors in the
equations might be correlated. Therefore, in the basic regressions, we allow for the possi-
bility of correlated errors and estimate a SUR model with equations explaining the levels
of current and capital expenditures. Equations are estimated with municipalities and time
fixed effects.
An additional concern is the possibility of endogeneity of the electoral system with
respect to the unobserved characteristics of the municipalities, the economic situation as
well as levels of political competition. It is also possible that bigger municipalities, and
in particular cities might be more likely to adopt certain rules. If this is true, the effect
of the electoral rules will be underestimated, as it would merely reflect differences in e.g.
returns to scale in the public services provision between larger and smaller municipalities.
In the second set of regressions, we allow for the electoral rules to be endogenous and in
the first stage regressions explained by the area of the municipality, population density as
well as electoral competition levels measured by the number of party lists standing for the
elections in the years 1985, 1990 and 1995, thus before the institutional change of the year
2000.
3. Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the estimations, with and without the possibil-
ity of endogeneity of the electoral rules. First inspection of the tables reveals, that the
municipalities in which the mayor is elected directly by the inhabitants have on average
lower levels of capital expenditure. Moreover, in the municipalities in which more than one
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candidate stands for the election, the level of electoral competition decreases also the levels
of current expenditures. The first observation can be related to the possibility that the
mayors and council do not coincide in terms of expenditure planning: problem which does
not exist whenever the mayors are elected from the members of the municipal council. The
second observation corresponds to the hypothesis that higher electoral competition should
be associated with lower levels of expenditure. The latter hypothesis is further supported
by the positive and significant sign of the Margin of victory variable in Table 2, which sug-
gests that strong candidates correlate with higher capital and current expenditure levels.
For the party–list as opposed to the open system, we observe the former to be related to
higher levels of both capital and current expenditures. Again, this result can be associated
with the hypothesis that probability of reelection affects the levels of expenditure. Addi-
tionally, we find evidence of electoral cycles, particularly strong for the case of short–term
current expenditure, which collides with previous evidence in the literature.
We test the robustness of the results by excluding cities from the sample (Table 3 in the
Appendix), as well as by dividing the sample according to political districts (Tables 4, 5 and
6 in the Appendix). Except for the case of Feldkirch region, which however offers only a few
observations and little variation, the main results that direct elections are associated with
lower expenditure levels whereas party lists correpond to higher expenditure are robust.
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Table 1: Fixed effects SUR model for current and capital expenditures
(1) (2)
Current Capital Current Capital
Revenue 0.55*** 1.48*** 0.53*** 1.49***
(26.14) (12.79) (25.07) (12.70)
Inhabitants -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***
(-6.55) (3.60) (-6.56) (3.58)
Pop Under 15 -1.62*** 1.71 -1.19*** 1.48
(-6.96) (1.35) (-5.04) (1.12)
Pop in Retirement 2.40*** -1.39 1.79*** -1.05
(7.74) (-0.82) (5.66) (-0.60)
Unemployment -0.70*** -0.45 -0.33* -0.65
(-4.26) (-0.50) (-1.95) (-0.69)
Municipal Taxes 0.11*** -0.19 0.13*** -0.20
(4.75) (-1.49) (5.74) (-1.57)
Communal Taxes 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.09
(1.18) (-0.92) (0.83) (-0.88)
1 Year Before 0.05** -0.00 0.04* 0.00
(2.28) (-0.02) (1.96) (0.02)
Election Year 0.07*** 0.06 0.08*** 0.06
(3.35) (0.54) (3.75) (0.50)
1 Year After 0.03* -0.03 0.03 -0.02
(1.66) (-0.24) (1.24) (-0.19)
Direct Mayor 0.02 -1.23*** -0.05 -1.19**
(0.20) (-2.61) (-0.60) (-2.51)
2 Candidates -0.15* 0.46 -0.10 0.43
(-1.96) (1.08) (-1.28) (1.01)
3 Candidates -0.18** 0.63 -0.14** 0.61
(-2.52) (1.61) (-1.96) (1.54)
4 Candidates -0.19*** 0.76** -0.15** 0.74**
(-2.72) (2.04) (-2.30) (1.99)
5 Candidates -0.13** 0.14 -0.12** 0.14
(-2.08) (0.41) (-2.05) (0.40)
List System 0.07 1.73*** -0.12 1.84***
(0.71) (3.14) (-1.18) (3.20)
1 List -0.19** -0.07 -0.13* -0.10
(-2.55) (-0.17) (-1.84) (-0.24)
2 Lists 0.08 -0.54 0.09 -0.55
(1.31) (-1.54) (1.38) (-1.55)
3 Lists 0.07 -0.65** 0.07 -0.65**
(1.31) (-2.23) (1.26) (-2.23)
4 Lists 0.01 -0.62** 0.01 -0.62**
(0.20) (-2.45) (0.17) (-2.45)
5 Lists 0.05 -0.29 0.03 -0.28
(1.15) (-1.24) (0.82) (-1.20)
Turnout Mayor 0.12** 0.50* 0.13*** 0.49*
(2.52) (1.90) (2.84) (1.87)
Turnout Council -0.32*** -1.74*** 0.00 -1.91***
(-3.30) (-3.30) (0.04) (-3.24)
Margin Mayor -0.01 0.63* -0.02 0.63*
(-0.17) (1.90) (-0.25) (1.91)
Margin Council -0.04 0.11 -0.05 0.12
(-0.62) (0.32) (-0.78) (0.33)
Mum FE YES YES YES YES
Year NO NO YES YES
Stadt 0.30*** -0.82* 0.35*** -0.84**
(3.93) (-1.95) (4.58) (-2.00)
Markt 0.04 0.28* 0.06** 0.28*
(1.46) (1.78) (2.06) (1.72)
Constant 20.38*** 95.59*** -25.95*** 121.13**
(3.22) (2.77) (-2.81) (2.35)
Observations 988 988 988 988
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4. Conclusions
Using a unique set of electoral laws present in the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg,
we analyze how rules of election of municipal councils and mayors affect levels of local
expenditure. We find evidence that party–list system is associated with higher levels of
expenditure and that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower size of the
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Table 2: Fixed effects IV model for current and capital expenditures
(1) (2)
Current Capital Direct Mayor List System Current Capital Direct Mayor List System
Revenue 0.59*** 1.50*** 0.55*** 1.53***
(24.59) (11.18) (22.55) (11.33)
Inhabitants -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***
(-6.43) (3.44) (-6.56) (3.40)
Pop Under 15 -0.96*** 1.94 -1.03*** 1.98
(-3.41) (1.34) (-3.93) (1.36)
Pop in Retirement 1.94*** -0.96 1.70*** -0.83
(5.42) (-0.51) (5.01) (-0.44)
Unemployment -0.37* -0.44 -0.28 -0.48
(-1.96) (-0.44) (-1.59) (-0.49)
Municipal Taxes 0.13*** -0.16 0.13*** -0.16
(5.03) (-1.19) (5.40) (-1.19)
Communal Taxes -0.01 -0.13 0.01 -0.14
(-0.36) (-1.19) (0.44) (-1.26)
1 Year Before 0.06*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02
(2.63) (0.11) (2.13) (0.17)
Election Year 0.04 0.03 0.06*** 0.02
(1.57) (0.24) (2.86) (0.12)
1 Year After 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.19) (-0.17) (0.77) (-0.22)
Direct Mayor -0.26** -1.50*** -0.11 -1.56***
(-2.40) (-2.62) (-1.08) (-2.73)
2 Candidates -0.17** 0.39 -0.11 0.36
(-2.01) (0.90) (-1.38) (0.84)
3 Candidates -0.18** 0.59 -0.14** 0.58
(-2.31) (1.49) (-1.98) (1.45)
4 Candidates -0.19*** 0.72* -0.16** 0.71*
(-2.61) (1.93) (-2.34) (1.89)
5 Candidates -0.13** 0.13 -0.13** 0.13
(-2.01) (0.39) (-2.05) (0.38)
List System 1.22*** 3.08* 0.26 3.54**
(4.78) (1.77) (0.83) (2.03)
1 List 0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.17
(0.41) (0.24) (-0.79) (0.35)
2 Lists 0.29*** -0.36 0.15* -0.29
(3.57) (-0.80) (1.91) (-0.65)
3 Lists 0.15*** -0.56* 0.09* -0.53*
(2.58) (-1.79) (1.67) (-1.70)
4 Lists 0.01 -0.62** 0.01 -0.62**
(0.23) (-2.46) (0.24) (-2.45)
5 Lists 0.06 -0.28 0.04 -0.27
(1.30) (-1.16) (0.96) (-1.13)
Turnout Mayor 0.27*** 0.61* 0.18*** 0.66**
(4.50) (1.89) (3.06) (2.02)
Turnout Council -1.15*** -2.77* -0.31 -3.19**
(-5.74) (-1.89) (-1.16) (-2.18)
Margin Mayor 0.15** 0.81** 0.03 0.87**
(2.05) (1.99) (0.46) (2.13)
Margin Council -0.46*** -0.31 -0.18 -0.45
(-4.07) (-0.45) (-1.44) (-0.66)
Mun FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Stadt 0.30*** -0.87** -0.24*** -0.18*** 0.35*** -0.89** -0.24*** -0.18***
(3.67) (-2.04) (-3.11) (-2.60) (4.50) (-2.09) (-3.12) (-2.62)
Markt 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.04 0.06** 0.26 0.04 0.04
(1.39) (1.62) (1.02) (1.07) (2.00) (1.58) (0.99) (1.08)
Lists1985 0.05** 0.14*** 0.05** 0.15***
(2.23) (7.43) (2.16) (7.56)
Lists1990 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01 -0.06***
(-0.34) (-2.63) (-0.28) (-2.71)
Lists1995 0.13*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01
(7.94) (0.56) (7.95) (0.55)
Area 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(2.79) (0.29) (2.80) (0.26)
Pop Density 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00***
(1.65) (2.97) (1.69) (2.94)
Constant 30.22*** 137.96** -39.75*** -24.62** -15.22 160.55** -39.40*** -24.15**
(4.31) (2.08) (-3.08) (-2.14) (-1.27) (2.42) (-3.05) (-2.09)
Observations 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
public sector. Further step in this research should include party effects as well as party
alignment to the federal government as potentially affecting the access to revenues as well
as political preferences of the local councils.
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Appendix
Table 3: Fixed effects IV model for current and capital expenditures - no cities
(1) (2)
Current Capital Direct Mayor List System Current Capital Direct Mayor List System
Revenue 0.60*** 1.47*** 0.56*** 1.52***
(23.86) (11.61) (22.26) (11.07)
Inhabitants -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***
(-6.35) (3.35) (-5.77) (3.01)
Pop Under 15 -0.78*** 1.56 -0.89*** 1.71
(-2.66) (1.05) (-3.27) (1.14)
Pop in Retirement 1.96*** -1.29 1.73*** -0.96
(5.36) (-0.70) (5.04) (-0.51)
Unemployment -0.29 -0.52 -0.23 -0.62
(-1.48) (-0.52) (-1.24) (-0.62)
Municipal Taxes 0.13*** -0.19 0.13*** -0.18
(4.90) (-1.34) (5.16) (-1.30)
Communal Taxes -0.00 -0.12 0.01 -0.14
(-0.16) (-1.03) (0.63) (-1.22)
1 Year Before 0.06*** 0.03 0.05** 0.04
(2.67) (0.23) (2.25) (0.39)
Election Year 0.03 0.09 0.06** 0.05
(1.37) (0.75) (2.56) (0.42)
1 Year After 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.21) (0.59) (0.06)
Direct Mayor -0.34*** -1.17* -0.19 -1.39**
(-2.82) (-1.91) (-1.63) (-2.17)
2 Candidates -0.11 0.37 -0.07 0.31
(-1.14) (0.76) (-0.75) (0.62)
3 Candidates -0.13 0.55 -0.11 0.52
(-1.39) (1.19) (-1.24) (1.11)
4 Candidates -0.13 0.64 -0.12 0.62
(-1.49) (1.45) (-1.43) (1.40)
5 Candidates -0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.14
(-1.24) (0.31) (-1.49) (0.34)
List System 1.44*** 1.74 0.50 3.11
(5.20) (1.24) (1.44) (1.63)
1 List 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.25
(0.13) (0.23) (-0.94) (0.50)
2 Lists 0.27*** -0.38 0.14* -0.20
(3.10) (-0.87) (1.67) (-0.43)
3 Lists 0.10 -0.46 0.05 -0.38
(1.59) (-1.38) (0.88) (-1.13)
4 Lists -0.06 -0.42 -0.05 -0.43
(-0.97) (-1.44) (-0.91) (-1.47)
5 Lists 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.10
(0.11) (-0.44) (-0.15) (-0.36)
Turnout Mayor 0.29*** 0.47 0.20*** 0.59*
(4.73) (1.51) (3.36) (1.78)
Turnout Council -1.30*** -1.72 -0.48 -2.91*
(-5.93) (-1.55) (-1.63) (-1.82)
Margin Mayor 0.16** 0.64* 0.04 0.80*
(2.05) (1.67) (0.58) (1.92)
Margin Council -0.55*** 0.15 -0.28** -0.25
(-4.62) (0.25) (-2.08) (-0.35)
Mun FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Markt 0.10*** 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.10*** 0.15 0.04 0.04
(2.79) (0.82) (0.94) (1.01) (3.03) (0.82) (0.91) (1.01)
Listen1985 0.05** 0.14*** 0.04** 0.14***
(2.02) (7.01) (1.96) (7.13)
Listen1990 -0.01 -0.05** -0.01 -0.05**
(-0.28) (-2.49) (-0.24) (-2.56)
Listen1995 0.13*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01
(7.74) (0.57) (7.76) (0.55)
Area 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(2.97) (0.40) (2.97) (0.38)
Pop Density 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00***
(1.68) (2.86) (1.70) (2.84)
Constant 33.09*** 98.38*** -42.62*** -25.45** -8.66 159.02** -42.35*** -24.90**
(4.53) (2.67) (-3.18) (-2.12) (-0.69) (2.30) (-3.16) (-2.08)
Observations 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 944
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Fixed effects IV model for current and capital expenditures - Region Bludenz, no cities
(1) (2)
Current Capital Direct Mayor List System Current Capital Direct Mayor List System
Revenue 0.54*** 1.18*** 0.51*** 1.20***
(10.81) (4.69) (10.75) (4.65)
Inhabitants -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(-3.65) (-0.59) (-1.72) (-0.70)
Pop Under 15 0.72 0.06 0.64 0.09
(0.99) (0.02) (0.95) (0.02)
Pop in Retirement 3.15*** -0.09 2.49*** 0.21
(4.60) (-0.03) (3.76) (0.06)
Unemployment 0.73* -2.42 0.88** -2.51
(1.74) (-1.14) (2.23) (-1.17)
Municipal Taxes 0.09** -0.13 0.13*** -0.15
(2.18) (-0.65) (3.25) (-0.72)
Communal Taxes 0.10** -0.09 0.08* -0.08
(2.28) (-0.39) (1.88) (-0.33)
1 Year Before 0.11*** 0.05 0.08** 0.07
(3.00) (0.26) (2.30) (0.33)
Election Year 0.02 0.14 0.07* 0.11
(0.49) (0.65) (1.72) (0.51)
1 Year After -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
(-0.37) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04)
Direct Mayor -1.11*** -1.35 -0.35 -1.77
(-4.07) (-0.98) (-1.25) (-1.14)
2 Candidates -0.00 -2.01** 0.25 -2.13**
(-0.00) (-2.03) (1.32) (-2.03)
3 Candidates 0.10 -1.19 0.22 -1.25
(0.61) (-1.42) (1.41) (-1.45)
4 Candidates 0.17 -1.16 0.18 -1.17
(1.04) (-1.43) (1.20) (-1.42)
5 Candidates 0.12 -1.87** 0.17 -1.90**
(0.75) (-2.36) (1.17) (-2.37)
List System 2.12*** 5.90** -0.14 7.06*
(3.71) (2.04) (-0.20) (1.81)
1 List -0.46*** 0.06 -0.36** 0.01
(-3.01) (0.08) (-2.42) (0.01)
2 Lists 0.56*** -0.08 0.25 0.08
(3.32) (-0.09) (1.42) (0.08)
3 Lists 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.09
(0.52) (0.12) (0.26) (0.14)
4 Lists -0.06 -0.34 -0.11 -0.31
(-0.61) (-0.66) (-1.15) (-0.61)
5 Lists 0.14 -0.43 -0.07 -0.33
(1.38) (-0.84) (-0.66) (-0.57)
Turnout Mayor 0.04 0.31 -0.03 0.34
(0.26) (0.44) (-0.25) (0.48)
Turnout Council -1.72*** -3.63 0.08 -4.52
(-3.52) (-1.46) (0.12) (-1.33)
Margin Mayor 0.52*** 0.37 0.00 0.62
(2.65) (0.37) (0.01) (0.52)
Margin Council -1.20*** 0.04 -0.46* -0.33
(-5.01) (0.03) (-1.67) (-0.22)
Mun FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Markt 0.14* 0.79* 0.18** 0.19** 0.16** 0.78* 0.18** 0.19**
(1.66) (1.82) (2.22) (2.41) (1.97) (1.79) (2.22) (2.42)
Listen1985 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41***
(9.97) (10.61) (9.85) (10.60)
Listen1990 -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.20***
(-5.49) (-4.92) (-5.47) (-4.93)
Listen1995 -0.07* -0.11*** -0.07* -0.11***
(-1.86) (-2.94) (-1.83) (-2.97)
Area 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(4.52) (4.78) (4.52) (4.81)
Pop Density 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(5.44) (6.01) (5.47) (6.05)
Constant -323.63** -549.47 -266.56 -87.22 -401.79*** -516.85 -270.98 -89.60
(-1.97) (-0.66) (-1.34) (-0.45) (-2.58) (-0.61) (-1.36) (-0.46)
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Fixed effects IV model for current and capital expenditures - Region Bregenz, no cities
(1) (2)
Current Capital Direct Mayor List System Current Capital Direct Mayor List System
Revenue 0.47*** 1.96*** 0.45*** 1.94***
(9.71) (8.51) (9.74) (8.18)
Inhabitants -0.00* 0.00*** -0.00 0.00***
(-1.84) (4.65) (-1.63) (4.63)
Pop Under 15 -0.94* 2.77 -1.02* 2.72
(-1.65) (1.04) (-1.95) (1.02)
Pop in Retirement 1.30** 2.06 0.92 1.82
(2.10) (0.71) (1.56) (0.60)
Unemployment -0.88** -1.33 -0.80** -1.28
(-2.35) (-0.76) (-2.32) (-0.72)
Municipal Taxes 0.18*** -0.78*** 0.20*** -0.77***
(3.14) (-2.84) (3.71) (-2.76)
Communal Taxes -0.06 0.09 -0.08* 0.08
(-1.45) (0.43) (-1.87) (0.39)
1 Year Before 0.02 -0.14 0.01 -0.14
(0.54) (-0.85) (0.36) (-0.87)
Election Year 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09
(0.85) (0.45) (1.37) (0.49)
1 Year After -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
(-0.12) (-0.11) (0.03) (-0.09)
Direct Mayor -0.26 -1.74 -0.15 -1.67
(-0.84) (-1.18) (-0.52) (-1.11)
2 Candidates -0.21 1.46 -0.25 1.44
(-0.82) (1.20) (-1.04) (1.18)
3 Candidates -0.15 1.58 -0.16 1.58
(-0.65) (1.45) (-0.75) (1.45)
4 Candidates -0.33* 1.06 -0.30* 1.08
(-1.72) (1.18) (-1.68) (1.19)
5 Candidates -0.10 0.76 -0.12 0.74
(-0.67) (1.07) (-0.85) (1.05)
List System 2.12** 1.62 1.32 1.12
(2.43) (0.39) (1.51) (0.25)
1 List 0.60* 1.39 0.39 1.26
(1.66) (0.82) (1.14) (0.71)
2 Lists 0.77** 0.81 0.55* 0.67
(2.25) (0.50) (1.68) (0.40)
3 Lists 0.54** 0.26 0.39 0.16
(2.16) (0.22) (1.60) (0.13)
4 Lists 0.10 0.39 0.05 0.35
(0.73) (0.58) (0.40) (0.53)
5 Lists 0.11 0.00 0.05 -0.04
(0.76) (0.00) (0.35) (-0.05)
Turnout Mayor 0.43*** 0.59 0.36*** 0.54
(3.32) (0.96) (2.94) (0.86)
Turnout Council -1.35** -1.24 -0.75 -0.86
(-2.56) (-0.50) (-1.33) (-0.30)
Margin Mayor 0.16 0.26 0.13 0.24
(1.23) (0.43) (1.08) (0.40)
Margin Council -1.12** -0.39 -0.78* -0.18
(-2.34) (-0.17) (-1.68) (-0.07)
Mun FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Markt 0.16* -0.58 0.01 -0.10 0.12 -0.61 0.01 -0.10
(1.93) (-1.49) (0.16) (-1.39) (1.49) (-1.51) (0.16) (-1.39)
Listen1985 -0.18*** 0.04 -0.18*** 0.05
(-5.13) (1.35) (-5.12) (1.40)
Listen1990 0.20*** 0.07** 0.20*** 0.07*
(5.01) (1.98) (5.00) (1.94)
Listen1995 0.13*** -0.09*** 0.13*** -0.09***
(3.63) (-2.83) (3.64) (-2.81)
Area 0.01*** 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00*
(4.26) (1.68) (4.24) (1.68)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
(1.54) (3.29) (1.54) (3.28)
Constant -266.44** -482.22 508.05*** 698.47*** -250.82** -472.25 507.86*** 697.20***
(-2.41) (-0.93) (3.28) (4.96) (-2.48) (-0.91) (3.28) (4.95)
Observations 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Fixed effects IV model for current and capital expenditures - Region Feldkirch, nocities
(1) (2)
Current Capital Direct Mayor List System Current Capital Direct Mayor List System
Revenue 0.58*** 1.50*** 0.50*** 1.48***
(9.25) (3.88) (7.80) (3.55)
Inhabitants -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00 0.00
(-2.63) (1.68) (-1.55) (1.63)
Pop Under 15 -0.93* 3.00 -1.09** 2.94
(-1.66) (0.87) (-2.02) (0.84)
Pop in Retirement 1.05 5.00 1.05 5.06
(1.09) (0.84) (1.15) (0.85)
Unemployment -1.39*** 1.96 -1.04*** 2.05
(-3.50) (0.80) (-2.62) (0.80)
Municipal Taxes 0.12 -0.23 0.02 -0.26
(1.42) (-0.45) (0.18) (-0.47)
Communal Taxes 0.02 -0.14 0.11* -0.11
(0.33) (-0.36) (1.73) (-0.27)
1 Year Before 0.06* 0.14 0.05 0.13
(1.75) (0.62) (1.39) (0.59)
Election Year 0.06 0.14 0.09** 0.15
(1.59) (0.57) (2.32) (0.58)
1 Year After 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.17
(1.01) (0.72) (1.58) (0.73)
Direct Mayor 0.10 -0.94 0.14 -0.93
(0.62) (-0.91) (0.85) (-0.90)
2 Candidates -0.24* -0.79 -0.07 -0.74
(-1.82) (-0.99) (-0.56) (-0.86)
3 Candidates -0.28** -0.41 -0.15 -0.37
(-2.40) (-0.57) (-1.31) (-0.49)
4 Candidates -0.23** -0.07 -0.14 -0.05
(-2.26) (-0.11) (-1.41) (-0.07)
List System 0.68 4.97 -0.53 4.64
(1.27) (1.50) (-0.84) (1.13)
1 List -0.22 1.79 -0.44* 1.72
(-0.92) (1.22) (-1.83) (1.11)
2 Lists 0.05 0.85 -0.07 0.81
(0.32) (0.86) (-0.42) (0.79)
3 Lists 0.03 -0.30 -0.02 -0.32
(0.52) (-0.86) (-0.37) (-0.86)
4 Lists -0.06 -0.57** -0.04 -0.56**
(-1.28) (-2.08) (-1.06) (-2.06)
Turnout Mayor 0.11 0.66 -0.04 0.62
(0.89) (0.89) (-0.33) (0.77)
Turnout Council -0.88*** -3.19 0.13 -2.91
(-2.73) (-1.60) (0.29) (-1.01)
Margin Mayor -0.09 1.95** -0.19 1.92**
(-0.62) (2.13) (-1.31) (2.04)
Margin Council -0.01 -1.61 0.20 -1.54
(-0.05) (-1.10) (0.85) (-1.00)
Mun FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Markt 0.11 -0.14 -0.35*** -0.20*** 0.06 -0.15 -0.35*** -0.20***
(1.29) (-0.27) (-4.62) (-3.32) (0.71) (-0.28) (-4.62) (-3.31)
Listen1985 -0.19*** -0.03 -0.19*** -0.03
(-4.04) (-0.83) (-4.05) (-0.86)
Listen1990 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.11***
(5.22) (3.48) (5.23) (3.51)
Listen1995 0.13*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.00
(5.96) (0.03) (5.96) (0.01)
Area 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(5.69) (2.59) (5.68) (2.58)
Pop Density 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 0.00**
(1.75) (2.26) (1.74) (2.26)
Constant 182.84 -1150.74 180.21 1121.48*** 239.25 -1168.99 180.46 1122.96***
(0.79) (-0.81) (0.66) (5.09) (1.08) (-0.82) (0.66) (5.10)
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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